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Abstract
We investigate the bearings product market collusion on the abatement of
polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production entails a nega-
tive environmental externality. We model the problem as a diﬀerential game
and investigate the feedback solution of two alternative settings: a fully non-
cooperative oligopoly and a cartel maximising the discounted profits of all
firms in the industry. Our analysis proves that the output reduction en-
tailed by collusive behaviour may have a benefiacial eﬀect on steady state
welfare, as a result of the balance between a higher market price and a lower
amount of polluting emissions. This result opens a new prespective on the
debate about the management of environmental externalities, which so far
has mainly focussed on the design of Pigouvian taxation schemes.
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1 Introduction
The control of polluting emissions damaging the environment is a hot issue
and is receiving an increasing amount of attention in the current literature
in the field of environmental economics. Most of the existing contributions
investigate the design of optimal Pigouvian taxation aimed at inducing firms
to reduce damaging emissions, both in monopoly and oligopoly settings.1
Accordingly, the established approach to this problem consists in taking the
social optimum, where a benevolent planner chooses a production plan for
the firms in the industry so as to maximise social welfare, as a benchmark
against which the performance of the profit-seeking firms has to be assessed.
This produces corrective policy measures which, ideally, should take the form
of tax schemes able to reproduce the same social welfare level associated with
the first best.
Another stream of literature analyses the feasibility of tradeable pollution
permits, which, however, may lead to the monopolization of the industry.2 As
we shall see in the remainder of the paper, in industries aﬀected by negative
externalities monopolization is not as bad as it is usually thought to be.
To the best of our knowledge, the potential benefits of appropriate com-
petition policy measures, unrelated to taxation or pollution permits, has
been disregarded so far. Our aim is precisely to outline, in an admittedly
unconventional and even provocative way, the beneficial eﬀects that collusion
or monopolization (and, as an ancillary case, horizontal merger waves) may
exert in a market where the production of the final output has the unde-
sirable property of generating negative environmental externalities. We use
an established diﬀerential game approach to this issue3 to prove that, under
1See Bergstrom et al. (1987), Karp and Livernois (1992, 1994) and Benchekroun and
Long (1998, 2002), inter alia.
2To this regard, see Newbery (1990) and von der Fehr (1993), inter alia.
3For a technical introduction to and a thourough overview of diﬀerential games applied
to environmental economics, see Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 12).
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specific conditions involving the relative size of intertemporal parameters, a
cartel maximising industry profits is socially preferable to a non-cooperative
oligopoly following feedback Nash rules. The basic intuition behind this
result is the trade-oﬀ between the welfare damage associated to any price
increase (such as the one usually brought about by collusion) and the desir-
able reduction in the emission as well as the stock of pollution implied by
any output contraction. Such a trade-oﬀ is of course absent in industries
where no external eﬀects take place: here the consequences of collusion or
cartelization are surely negative and the antitrust stance against collusive
behaviour is fully justified. However, current antitrust laws around the globe
never take explicitly into account the aforementioned trade-oﬀ and the re-
lated (potentially beneficial) consequences of cartels on the quality of the
environment.
The basic model is in section 2. The non-cooperative equilibrium and the
cartel equilibrium are outlined in section 3. Section 4 contains the welfare
analysis and the related implications for competition policy. Concluding
remarks are in section 5.
2 The setup
The general structure of the model is borrowed from Benchekroun and Long
(1998, 2002). Consider an oligopoly market over an infinite (continuous)
time horizon, t ∈ [0,∞) . Firms supply a homogeneous good, whose market
demand function is p (t) = a − Q (t) at any time t, with a > 0 and Q (t) =PN
i=1 qi (t) being the sum of all firms’ output levels. Production takes place at
constant returns to scale (CRS), with a marginal cost c constant and common
to all firms, so that firm i’s instantaneous cost function is Ci (t) = cqi (t) .
The production of the final output goes along with a negative environmental
externality taking the form of a flow of polluting emissions E (t) = Q (t) .
The stock of pollution, S (t) , evolves over time according to the following
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dynamics:
·
S (t) = Q (t)− δS (t) (1)
where δ > 0 is the decay rate of the stock. The instantaneous external eﬀect
Θ (t) generated by pollution is made of two components generated by the
flow Q (t) and the stock S (t), respectively:
Θ (t) = εQ (t) + γ
S2 (t)
2
; ε, γ > 0. (2)
Consumer surplus CS (t) is measured by the area below the demand function
and above market price p (t) , minus the externality Θ (t):
CS (t) =
Q2 (t)
2
− εQ (t)− γS
2 (t)
2
. (3)
It is worth noting that a contraction of output has ambiguous consequences
over consumer surplus, due to the presence of a negative externality pro-
portional to the output: on the one hand, shrinking output goes along with
increasing market price, which is harmful; on the other hand, it entails reduc-
ing the environmental externality, which is desirable. The balance between
these components will play a key role in the remainder of the analysis.
Social welfare, defined as the sum of industry profits and consumer sur-
plus, writes as follows:
SW (t) =
NX
i=1
πi (t) +
Q2 (t)
2
− εQ (t)− γS
2 (t)
2
, (4)
where πi (t) = [p (t)− c] qi (t) is firm i’s instantaneous profit function. Pa-
rameter ρ > 0 represents the constant discount factor common to all firms
in the industry.
In the remainder of the paper, we investigate two cases: (i) the non-
cooperative game where firms compete a` la Cournot-Nash to maximise indi-
vidual profits; (ii) the cartel case where firms explicitly cooperate to maximise
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joint profits. In case (i), firm i chooses qi (t) to maximise the discounted profit
flow:
Ji (t) =
Z ∞
0
πi (t) e−ρtdt (5)
s.t. the state dynamics (1) and the initial condition S (0) = S0. In case (ii),
the industry chooses its aggregate production so as to maximise
JC (t) =
Z ∞
0
Π (t) e−ρtdt, Π (t) =
NX
i=1
πi (t) (6)
under the same constraints. Subscript C stands for cartel.
3 Equilibrium analysis
Here we characterise the feedback equilibria of the two models, starting with
the non-cooperative game. The Bellman equation of firm i is:4
ρVi (S) = max
qi
½
πi +
∂Vi (S)
∂S
[Q− δS]
¾
(7)
where, in view of the linear-quadratic structure of the problem, we may
assume Vi (S) = g + hS + kS2, g, h, k being the unknown coeﬃcients. The
first order condition (FOC) is:
a− c+ h− 2qi −
X
j 6=i
qj + kS = 0. (8)
In view of the ex ante symmetry across firms, we impose qj = qi = q and solve
(8) to obtain the optimal individual output q∗ = (a− c+ h+ kS) / (N + 1) ,
to be plugged into (7), simplifying the latter as follows:
Φ (k)S2 +Ψ (h, k)S + Ω (g, h) = 0, (9)
4In the remainder of the paper we will omit the time argument for the sake of brevity.
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where Φ (k) , Ψ (h, k) and Ω (g, h) must be simultaneously equal to zero w.r.t.
g, h and k. This yields:
h = − (N
2 + 1) (a− c) k
2N2k − (δ + ρ) (N + 1)2
(10)
and5
k =
(N + 1)2 (2δ + ρ)
2N2
. (11)
Then, imposing
·
S = 0, we find the steady state level of the stock of pollution:
S∗ =
(a− c) [2δ + ρ (N2 + 1)]
δ (N + 1) [2δ + ρ (N + 1)]
. (12)
The resulting steady state levels of equilibrium individual output and
profits are:
q∗ =
(a− c) [2δ + ρ (N2 + 1)]
N (N + 1) [2δ + ρ (N + 1)]
(13)
π∗ =
2 (a− c)2 (δ + ρ) [2δ + ρ (N2 + 1)]
(N + 1)2 [2δ + ρ (N + 1)]2
(14)
while social welfare amounts to:
SW ∗ =
©
(a− c)
£
2δ + ρ
¡
N2 + 1
¢¤ · (15)£
(a− c)
¡
2δ3 (2N + 1) + δ2ρ (1 +N (N + 4))−
γ
¡
2δ + ρ
¡
N2 + 1
¢¢¢
− 2δ2ε (N + 1) (2δ + ρ (N + 1))
¤
/£
2δ2 (N + 1)2 (2δ + ρ (N + 1))2
¤
.
Having characterised the feedback Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we may ad-
dress the issue of the joint profit-maximising cartel, whose Bellman equation
is:
ρVC (S) = max
q
½
Π+
∂Vi (S)
∂S
[nq − δS]
¾
. (16)
5The other solution, h = k = 0, can be disregarded for obvious reasons.
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In the above expression, the symmetry condition qi = q for all i has been
imposed at the outset, so that the FOC is taken w.r.t. the output q of the
generic cartel member:
N (a− c− 2Nq + hC + kCS) = 0, (17)
where hC and kC are unknown coeﬃcients appering to the cartel’s value
function VC (S) = gC + hCS + kCS2. Obviously, given the CRS assumption,
the cartel is observationally equivalent to a pure monopoly replacing the
population of N firms. This yields, at the steady state equilibrium:
SC =
a− c
2δ
; qC =
a− c
2N
; ΠC =
(a− c)2
4
(18)
SWC =
(a− c)
£
δ2 (3 (a− c)− 4ε)− γ (a− c)
¤
8δ2
. (19)
In both cases, it cn be shown that the steady state, either (S∗, q∗) or (SC , qC)
is a sadlde point. The details of the stability analysis are omitted for brevity.6
4 Welfare assessment
The next step consist in a welfare comparison across the two regimes, in order
to draw some policy implictions. A preliminary observation in this respect
is that, while usually we would expect the cartel to operate a contraction
of industry output as compared to the non-cooperative oligopoly, (which
is the standard reason why a cartel is socially undesirable and therefore
prohibited by current antitrust laws around the world), here this does not
hold in general, as it can be quickly ascertained on the basis of (13) and (18):
q∗ − qC ∝ S∗ − SC ∝ ρN − ρ− 2δ > 0 (20)
for all N > 1 + 2δ/ρ, whith 1 + 2δ/ρ ≥ 2 for all δ ≥ ρ/2. We may therefore
claim:
6See Bencheckroun and Long (1998, 2002).
6
Lemma 1 If δ ≥ ρ/2, the cartel produces less than the non-cooperative
oligopoly. Accordingly, under the same condition, the stock of pollution as-
sociated with collusion is lower that that associated with non-cooperative be-
haviour.
The result stated in Lemma 1 is intriguing, as it suggests the possibility
that a cartel may indeed outperform a non-cooperative oligopoly on welfare
grounds. The reason is intuitive. Any output contraction raises the equi-
librium price and brings about an increase in profits as well as a decrease
in the part of consumer surplus that has to do strictly with consumption,
leaving any external eﬀect aside. The balance of these two eﬀects is always
negative as the deadweight loss caused by monopolization or cartelization
is not balanced by the increase in industry profits. Here, however, one has
to account for the presence of a negative externality appearing in consumer
surplus, which introduces a tradeoﬀ between the price eﬀect and the exter-
nal eﬀect: if shrinking the industry output translates into a suﬃciently large
reduction of the negative externality, then the overall balance may in fact
be positive, so as to induce one to reassess market power from a completely
unusual angle.
Using (15) and (19), we can verify that SWC−SW ∗ = 0 in correspondence
of7
N = 1; N = 1 +
2δ
ρ
, (21)
with SWC > SW ∗ for all N > 1+2δ/ρ, if this is an integer, or N larger than
the smallest integer larger than 1 + 2δ/ρ, otherwise. Accordingly, we have
Proposition 2 Collusion (or monopolization) of the industry enhances so-
cial welfare as compared to the non-cooperative oligopoly for all N > 1+2δ/ρ.
A straightforward ancillary result to the above Proposition is the follow-
ing:
7There exist other two roots, that can be disregarded since, for δ, ρ > 0, they are either
real but lower than one or imaginary.
7
Corollary 3 If δ ∈ [0, ρ/2] , then collusion (or monopolization) is welfare-
improving as compared to the non-cooperative oligopoly for all N ≥ 2.
A further possibility is to increase welfare through a reduction/increase in
the number of firms (and therefore in industry output as well as the associated
amount of pollution) via either horizontal mergers or a promotion of the entry
process. Using (12) and (15), it can be verified that
∂S∗
∂N
=
∂SW ∗
∂N
= 0 (22)
in N = ±p(2δ + ρ) /ρ. The negative root, N−, can be disregarded for ob-
vious reasons, while the positive one, N+, is larger or equal to two for all
δ ≥ 3ρ/2. Moreover,
∂S∗
∂N
< 0 and
∂SW ∗
∂N
> 0 (23)
for all N ∈
h
1,
p
(2δ + ρ) /ρ
´
, and conversely outside this range. Hence,
leaving aside the integer problem, we may claim:
Proposition 4 If δ ∈ [0, 3ρ/2] , then any horizontal merger is welfare-improving.
The proof of this claim is quickly outlined. For all δ ∈ (0, 3ρ/2] , the
root N+ ∈ (1, 2] . This implies that, in this range of δ, ∂SW ∗/∂N < 0 for
all N ≥ 2. Hence, reducing the number of firms through a horizontal merger
(or a wave thereof) surely enhances steady state welfare. Of course, while
this monotonicity property holds for suﬃciently low values of δ, it does not
beyond such a range, i.e., for all δ ≥ 3ρ/2. Here, the appropriate competition
policy must be designed according to the sign of N −N+: if N > N+, then
mergers are desirable; if instead N < N+, then a liberalization aimed at
increasing market competition is to be pursued.8
8This can be done by decreasing F, or eliminating it altogether. A policy of this kind
has been recently adopted in Italy in the taxi market. However, the related debate focussed
on the price side, without mentioning at all the external eﬀect concerning cars’ polluting
emissions.
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5 Conclusions
We have addressed the issue of pollution control in a diﬀerential game where
firms either compete or collude in output levels, to illustrate the so far ne-
glected perspective whereby collusion (or horizontal mergers) may indeed
contribute eﬀectively to reduce environmental externalities. This result stems
from a balance between two eﬀects operating in opposite directions, gener-
ated by the output contraction carried out by a cartel. One is the well
known (and per se undesirable) price increase always accompanying collu-
sive behaviour, the other is the decrease in polluting emissions that is specific
to industries like the one we have described here, and may turn out to be
suﬃciently strong to oﬀset the price eﬀect. Taking seriously the policy im-
plications of the foregoing analysis, one should explicitly mention the role
of externalities in the current antitrust rules, in order to carry out a careful
assessment of the pros and cons of collusive behaviour as well as increasing
market concentration through mergers in such industries.
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